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CREATING THE NATIONAL WEALTH: AUTHORSHIP,
COPYRIGHT, AND LITERARY CONTRACTS
MICHAEL BRANDON LOPEZ*

“Whereas if we approach a poet without this prejudice we shall often
find that not only the best, but the most individual parts of his work may be
those in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality most
vigorously.”1 – T.S. Eliot
ABSTRACT
The United States is a party to the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works. This Treaty provides for the protection of,
among other things, author’s moral rights, which are independent of
protection afforded by traditional United States copyright law. Despite the
United States’ accession to this Treaty, author’s moral rights are not
protected under current law, except in very narrow circumstances. This
Article addresses the important role that authors have as originators of
creative works that advance the cultural interests of the Nation and inspire
future creative efforts. As such, this Article argues for adopting a regime
that includes protection for author’s moral rights, through both statutory and
contracts law. This Article discusses that the United States is not fulfilling
its obligations under the Berne Convention, despite protestations to the
contrary, and discusses the reasons for resistance to full adherence to the
treaty. Moreover, this Article addresses the role of an author’s work and its
relationship and importance to the public domain. In reaching these
conclusions, this Article explores the historical development of copyright
protection, its development in the United States, including discussions of
both statutory law and historic case law addressing authors. In addition,
* This Article has been measured and shaped in large part by discussions with William P.
Johnson at the University of North Dakota School of Law, and it is to him that I dedicate this
work. The contributions of friends and colleagues in North Dakota cannot be underestimated – in
particular, Patti Alleva, Gregory S. Gordon, Joshua P. Fershee, Michael Crowell Beard, Michael
D. Lockhart, Michael S. McGinniss, Jan Stone, Benjamin J. Williams, and Larry Woiwode – all
contributed to my intellectual development and growth which allowed for the shaping, depth, and
reach of this argument to realize its full potential. Those many discussions refined my ideas, and
their contributions to my own thinking are scattered throughout these pages. Though, in proper
Medieval fashion – the errors are my own.
1. T.S. Eliot, Tradition and the Individual Talent, in MODERNISM: AN ANTHOLOGY, 152,
152 (Lawrence Rainey ed., 2005).
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this Article examines the protections afforded to authors under current
copyright law as well as Constitutional interpretations of the Federal
Constitution’s copyright clause as they relate to these issues. This Article
also analyzes the effect of those interpretations on understanding the role of
the author in relation to the rights and interests of the public. Finally, this
Article addresses the changing framework for assessing the rights and
interests of authors and the public in light of recent case law.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1579, the great Elizabethan poet Sir Philip Sidney wrote in his A
DEFENCE OF POETRY, “[on] the behalf of all poets, that while you live, you
live in love, and never get favour for lacking skill of a sonnet; and, when
you die, your memory die from the earth for want of an epitaph.”2 In his
essay, Sidney exhorts the capacity poets have to create the world, to
interpret the natural phenomena that we encounter and live in, and to shape
reality.3 Sidney’s vision is a romantic one that would later be taken up by,
among others, the poets William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor
Coleridge, all of whom illuminate the resources that poets are to the
societies and communities in which we live, work, and operate.4 Ironically,
Sidney’s A DEFENCE OF POETRY also had to guard against the rampant
censorship that authors were forced to endure in his contemporary
community in England, as part of the monopoly enjoyed by the Stationer’s
Company, operating under the Royal seal.5 Operating within these
confines, Sidney deftly moves the reader through his argument concerning
poetry and its ability to tell truth through metaphor, allegory, and other
rhetorical devices designed to fool the censors about his true literary
message.6

2. SIR PHILIP SIDNEY, A DEFENCE OF POETRY 75 (J.A. Van Dorsten ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1966) (1595).
3. BERYS GAUT, ART, EMOTION AND ETHICS 4 (2007) (“Sidney argued that poetry, with its
capacity to delineate precise situations and its power to move even obdurate hearts was of all
discourses the most suited to teach virtue.”).
4. See JAY PARINI, WHY POETRY MATTERS 22 (2008).
5. CYNDIA SUSAN CLEGG, PRESS CENSORSHIP IN ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND 20-21 (1997).
6. Robert E. Stillman, The Truths of a Slippery World: Poetry and Tyranny in Sidney’s
‘“Defence,’” 55 RENAISSANCE Q. 1287, 1295 (2002).
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Consequently, in our modern society, Sidney could not have
anticipated authors have no right, absent contractual provisions to the
contrary, to attribution for their work. Moreover, if authors did not believe
the work conformed to their fullest abilities, or viewed the work as against
their individual sensibility and morality they could not, absent contractual
provisions to the contrary, cause the work to be withdrawn from
publication.7 Indeed, authors without specific provisions embodied in a
publication agreement, do not have an absolute right to the integrity of their
work.8 Moreover, under our regime of copyright law, an author’s work can
be modified and distorted, ultimately subverting the author’s intentions and
artistic vision.9 As well, authors typically have no control to decide the
timing and method of the publication, known as the right of disclosure. 10
These aforementioned rights are known as moral rights, and they arguably
vest intrinsically in the author as creator of an individual work of artistic
merit, at the moment of that work’s inception.11
And yet we live in a society that cherishes notions of intellectual
property, and that recognizes that creators of original works of artistic merit
are deserving of reward in the form of a limited copyright to authors for
their work.12 Such a specific reward of exclusivity over their work ensures
authors can exploit their original creations, while also maintaining the valid
rights the public has to the intellectual achievements and advancements of
author’s creation, wherein at the limited-term expiration of the copyright
the work passes into the public domain, free for all to use. 13 These tensions
concerning the private economic interests of the individual author, and the
right of the public to the work, reflect the philosophical and economic
struggle between the desire to allow an individual to exploit the fruits of
7. ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 23 (2010) (“Although copyright law would seem to be the most
natural avenue for authors seeking to redress violations of the integrity of their texts, such
protections historically have been noticeably absent from the statutory scheme. Rather than afford
protection for the personal rights of authors with respect to their works, copyright law in this
country predominantly safeguards the pecuniary rights of the copyright owner . . . .”).
8. Id at 23-35 (discussing potential remedies available to an author under United States law).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 44.
11. See Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 356
(2006) (enumerating some of the major moral rights).
12. Benjamin Davidson, Note, Lost in Translation: Distinguishing Between French and
Anglo-American Natural Rights in Literary Property, and How Dastar Proves that the Difference
Still Matters, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 583, 585 (2005) (discussing the Framers desire to balance
public rights to works of intellectual advancement with the private, economic interests of
individual authors).
13. Alina Ng, The Social Contract and Authorship: Allocating Entitlements in the Copyright
System, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 413, 423 (2009) [hereinafter Ng, The
Social Contract and Authorship].
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their intellectual labors, while recognizing the fundamental understanding
that the public has a right to grow collectively as a society, without being
unduly hindered by costs associated with access to the knowledge created.14
Consequently, these philosophical underpinnings of the United States’
understanding of the balance between an individual’s exploitation of their
work and public rights of access are cemented in the Federal Constitution of
the United States.15
Our present system devalues authors and the intrinsic value of what
they create, while maintaining, incorrectly, an ideology that authors and
their economic interests form the basis for the system.16 Too often under
our present system the quality and intellectual merit of an author’s work are
compromised for the economic value that it can generate for commercial
interests. Moreover, the authors themselves lack even the basic moral
rights that authors in countries such as France, England, Germany, and Italy
have enjoyed for, in some cases, hundreds of years.17 Furthermore, the
United States is arguably not fulfilling its obligations under the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne
Convention”), which specifically contains a clause asserting the validity of,
and requiring the protection of, an author’s moral rights.18 Article 6bis of
the Berne Convention provides:
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation
or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to,
the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation.19

14. JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 11
(2008) (arguing that copyright protection should exist only so long as necessary to provide an
incentive to create, and thereafter fall into the public domain).
15. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries” (emphasis added)).
16. Alina Ng, The Authors Rights in Literary and Artistic Works, 9 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 453, 459-60 (2009) (discussing the economically driven underpinnings of our
current copyright system, and its effect on the public’s treatment of works of creative authorship)
[hereinafter Ng, Author Rights].
17. See generally id.; see also Davidson, supra note 12, at 585-86 (noting among other things
that French authors frequently defend their economic and moral rights); Rigamonti, supra note 11,
at 353-55 (providing an overview discussion of moral rights law in French, German, and Italian
law).
18. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, 25
U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
19. Id. at art. 6bis (emphasis added).
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The United States, when it finally acceded to the Berne Convention in
1988, did so only after recognizing that its own efforts to protect its
authors’ works internationally were abysmally unsuccessful.20 Even after
acceding to the Berne Convention, the United States did so only with the
recognition that its common law and statutory copyright protections were
sufficient to protect an author’s moral rights, as required under the
Convention.21 This, however, is not the case. The national wealth, as
embodied in our authors’ artistic achievements and products, are derided of
their literary value in a commercialized market designed to further the
interests of publishing distributors, not authors themselves. Ultimately,
under our current legal regime, the system serves to deprive the reading
public of valuable works that would otherwise be in the public domain.22
Additionally, this expense comes at the ironic and hypocritical cost of
authors’ moral rights, whose interests the copyright system should have as
its base purpose. Thus, in order to achieve the United States’ goals under
the Federal Constitution, our international obligations under the Berne
treaty (part of the supreme law of the United States), and to advance society
(all of which are embodied in our Constitutional provisions concerning
copyright and the role of authors), we should recognize the moral and
economic rights of authors.
Part II of this Article will provide a brief history of some of the major
moments in literary copyright history from an Anglo-American
perspective,23 and include a brief overview of the United States’ statutory
approach to copyright protections, and subsequent amendments to the
original Copyright Act of 1790. Part III will discuss the role of the author
in the life of the community, moral rights, and the importance that
authorship has to advancing the ideas and causes of society. Part IV will
discuss the clash of philosophies underpinning the debate between
economic interests, moral rights, and public rights. It will also address the
nature of literary publishing contracts, and the inherent inability for the so20. Davidson, supra note 12, at 587.
21. Donald Francis Madeo, Note, Literary Creation and American Copyright Law: Authors’
Wishes Hardly Resting in Peace, 5 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 179, 190-91 (1992) (discussing
amendments to the Berne Convention designed to satisfy international requirements of moral
rights, with United States’ law); STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 148 (4th ed.
2012).
22. W. Russell Taber, Note, Copyright Déjá Vu: A New Definition of “Publication” Under
the Copyright Act of 1909, 58 VAND. L. REV. 857, 862-63 (2005).
23. This Article will chiefly be focused on the rights of literary authors, that is, authors
whose works are of a written form, for example, novels, plays, poetry. However reference will
also be made to visual art, especially in light of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 § 106A of
the Copyright Act [hereinafter “VARA”], to elucidate that statute’s damage to moral rights
assertions under the common law.
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called “carefully crafted bargain” to cure the United States’ deficiencies
concerning authorial moral rights. Part IV also dispels the notion that the
current legal system is adequate to protect author’s moral rights and their
ability to assert them. Part V will suggest three solutions to these issues: (1)
scaled back copyright protection terms, (2) statutory protections for
author’s moral rights, and (3) using these statutory protections to provide
increased bargaining power for negotiating authors.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
LITERARY COPYRIGHT LAW
In order to understand the progression of the law surrounding literary
contracts, one must first look to the historical development of copyright,
and specifically to the interrelationships between booksellers, censorship,
and statutory enactments. Specifically, this section discusses early methods
of publication and production followed by relevant laws and statutes
affecting the legal background of literary contract law.
A. FROM MEDIEVAL MANUSCRIPT COPYING TO THE PRINTING PRESS
Prior to the introduction of the printing press in England, the work of
copying a book had to be done by hand.24 The results were spectacular,
gorgeously beautiful works of art in their own right, but they came at a
significant cost, as typically a monk or other member of a professional class
of scribes could only copy a certain number of books in a lifetime. 25 With
the introduction of the printing press by Johannes Gutenberg into the work
of manuscript copying and publication, the number of books that could be
printed substantially increased and had the result of simultaneously
lowering the costs of books.26
Subsequently, William Caxton’s
introduction of the printing press into England in 147127 had the similar
effect of lowering the cost of books, while allowing for a proliferation of

24. FRED LERNER, THE STORY OF LIBRARIES: FROM THE INVENTION OF WRITING TO THE
COMPUTER AGE 46 (2d ed. 2009) (describing aspects of the manuscript copying process).
25. CHRISTOPHER DE HAMEL, SCRIBES AND ILLUMINATORS 7 (1992) (“A monk had other
commitments as well as book production, and not only attended chapel up to eight times a day but
also took turns in other tasks around the monastery’s school, kitchen, guest house or garden . . . .
An eleventh-century monastic scribe, in no great haste, might achieve three or four moderate-sized
books a year.”).
26. Steven Kries, The Printing Press, THE HISTORY GUIDE, http://www historyguide.org/
intellect/press html (last updated May 13, 2004) (discussing the history of the printing press, and
its effect on book publication).
27. Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.) 840; NORMAN FRANCIS BLAKE,
WILLIAM CAXTON AND ENGLISH LITERARY CULTURE 5 (1991).
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printers to spring up to feed the public’s growing desire for cheap literary
texts.28 Indeed, as Benjamin Davidson notes,
Over the span of eighty years following the printing press’s
introduction, the guilds and their printing-age equivalents united to
form the Stationers’ Company, which, in 1557, was granted quasilegislative and judicial powers to regulate the printing industry.
The Company’s status as a royally sanctioned monopoly, allowed
it to control which authors and what content was printed, and
because it abided by the social order, that so preoccupied the
monarchs, the Stationers’ Company played a critical role in the
development of Anglo-American copyright law, ensuring that the
interests of copyright holders would be forever subordinated to the
public interest.29
Accordingly, the intermix and symbiotic relationship between
censorship, power, authority, and regulation of authorial rights emerged at
an early date, and in tandem with the rise of new technologies, which are
largely the precursors and foundations for our technologies of reproduction
today. Indeed, the power and pervasive influence exercised by subsequent
monarchs via the Stationers’ Company helped to create the presumption
that the only rights an author had were those of selling the manuscript itself,
without any further rights attaching to the author after that sale.30
The rights of booksellers, who acted as publishers and distributors of
literary works, predominated over any claim that the author might have
against shoddy publication work. Literary works were often badly put
together, incomplete, and deprived the author of any future royalty rights.
All of those rights vested in the booksellers, who enforced their rights
through special decrees from the secretive proceedings of the Star
28. NORMAN FRANCIS BLAKE, WILLIAM CAXTON AND ENGLISH LITERARY CULTURE 5
(2003) (noting that “[i]n England Caxton is generally honoured as the man who introduced
printing into England”); see also Blake’s general discussion concerning selections of what Caxton
chose to print, i.e. works that would likely please his audiences and sell many copies, but which
were not generally held to a high literary standard.
29. Davidson, supra note 12, at 589. Davidson also aptly points out the psychological effect
this had on some of the leading authors of the time, such as John Milton, whose PARADISE LOST
remains a classic. Id. at 592-93. As Davidson sees it “in AEROPAGATICA, one of the first pieces by
an author in support of authors, Milton championed authors’ individuality, but not authors’
rights.” Id. at 593 (emphasis added). But see Alina Ng, Authors and Readers: Conceptualizing
Authorship in Copyright Law, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 377, 390 (2008) (“In opposing
censorship and state licensing of book printing, John Milton’s AEROPAGITICA speech elevated the
author to a dignified creator of works, who should not be subjected to the control of printers
through royal and ecclesiastical censorship.”).
30. Davidson, supra note 12, at 590. But see Alina Ng, Authors and Readers:
Conceptualizing Authorship in Copyright Law, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 377, 390 (2008)
[hereinafter Ng, Authors and Readers].
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Chamber.31 Utilizing the authority of the Star Chamber, the Stationers’
Company could thwart unauthorized publications, and close print shops not
licensed by them.32 Such was the state of affairs that, as Davidson notes,
“during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when booksellers, printers,
monarchs, and Parliament were all vying for control of the burgeoning book
trade, no authors asserted any rights in British courts.”33 Indeed, the Star
Chambers’ decrees were so draconian that they permitted the banning of the
printing of any book that conflicted with any decree promulgated under the
secretive auspices of its orders and decrees, and went so far as to permit
agents of the Stationers’ Company the right to search premises for material
that would contravene the censorship laws.34
B. THE COMMON LAW AND THE STATUTORY BEGINNING
OF COPYRIGHT
Nevertheless, the Star Chamber did, eventually, grant rights to authors
over their work, allowing it to become a form of property.35 In response,
authors were required to sign contracts indicating their assent to the
transferability of exclusive rights to the literary work in question to the
publisher.36 It was not until 1709 with the Long Parliament’s passage of An
Act for the Encouragement of Learning (“Statute of Anne”),37 however, that
copyright protections truly accrued as a matter of right on behalf of English
authors. Indeed, the Statute of Anne is generally seen as the moment of
conception for modern copyright law.38
31. The Star Chamber was a secretive court enacted to deal with prominent individuals,
whom it was thought an ordinary court could not justly try. Its secrecy, however, without any
procedural safeguards, gave rise to its reputation for abuses of power, and it is now primarily
viewed as exemplifying excesses of Royal authority, and its use as a political tool to thwart
opposition
to
that
authority.
See,
e.g.,
Star
Chamber
Definition,
http://www.duhaime.org/legaldictionary/s/starchamber.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). The Star
Chamber arguably influenced our own procedural protections and safeguards under the Federal
Constitution. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595-96 (1990) (discussing the rights and
privileges arising under the Fifth Amendment). Accord Donaldson, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. at 841
(“The Star Chamber was a criminal court, and had not constitutional authority to determine civil
rights. That court has long since been abolished, without regret; and it is the happiness of the
subject, that the common law has flowed through purer channels.”).
32. Davidson, supra note 12, at 591.
33. Id.
34. See ORDINANCE OF THE STAR CHAMBER FOR THE CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS (1566),
reprinted in SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 315, 315 (Burton
Adams & Henry Morse Stephens eds., Macmillan 1901).
35. Davidson, supra note 12, at 593-94.
36. Id. at 594.
37. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, During the Times Therein Mentioned, 1710, 8 Anne, c.
19 (Eng.). [hereinafter Statute of Anne].
38. LIOR ZERNER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT 36-37 (2007).
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Under the Statute of Anne, authors were granted a fourteen year
monopoly over their work, which could be renewed for an additional
fourteen years, thus ensuring the author’s economic interests in their work
under statutory law.39 However, two important prevailing views at the time
of the Statute of Anne’s enactment were that (1) the publisher whom the
author had transferred his rights to attained the perpetual copyright that the
author had enjoyed at common law regardless of the Statute’s period of
protection concluding, and (2) at the conclusion of the twenty-eight year
period established then by Statute, the copyright lapsed, and any publisher
could subsequently reprint the work without fear of violating another
publisher’s copyright over the work.40
1.

Relevant Case Law Interpreting the Statute of Anne

Inevitably the courts were drawn into the controversy, and were
required to interpret the statute. The two cases of significance dealing with
the Statute of Anne were Millar v. Taylor,41 and Donaldson v. Beckett.42
a.

Millar v. Taylor – A Perpetual Common Law Copyright

In Millar, the 1769 English courts dealt with issues of copyright
involving the work of poet James Thomson.43 Andrew Millar, a bookseller,
had acquired the rights to publish Thomson’s THE SEASONS. Millar caused
to be printed 2,000 copies of the work, and subsequently an additional
1,000 copies of the work.44 Similarly, Robert Taylor, another bookseller,
surreptitiously printed copies of the work, despite the fact that Millar still
had quantities of the work on hand, who as a result of Taylor’s allegedly
unauthorized reproduction subsequently suffered economic injury by his
printing of the work.45
However, the work in question’s copyright – THE SEASONS – had
expired.46 Therefore, the question presented to the court was whether there
existed, as had existed at common law, a perpetual copyright vesting to the
author, such that a work could never enter the public domain.47 The court

39. BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 11-12 (2004).
40. Id.
41. (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.).
42. (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.).
43. Millar, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. at 202.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 202-03.
46. Id. at 206.
47. Id.
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found for Andrew Millar, assessing that the Statute of Anne merely codified
the common-law rights of a perpetual copyright vesting in an author, and
concomitantly in the publisher, Millar, to whom the poet James Thomson
had transferred his rights.48
b.

Donaldson v. Beckett – The House of Lords Reverses
Course and Establishes the Modern Trend

However, the 1774 case of Donaldson reversed Millar, and found that
no such common law right of perpetual copyright ever existed in an author,
and the only one that did exist was that established by statute, under the
auspices of the Statute of Anne.49 The Donaldson case involves very
similar facts to those at hand in Millar – the subject matter once again
concerned the eponymous works of poet James Thomson.50 After the
Millar case was resolved in Andrew Millar’s favor, his heirs (Andrew
Millar died the day after the decision was rendered),51 sold some of the
rights in Thomson’s poetry to printer Thomas Beckett.52 After acquiring
these rights the new copyright holders filed an action against Alexander
Donaldson who had been printing illegal copies of the poems.53 Relying on
the decision in Millar, the Court of Chancery granted an injunction against
Donaldson.54
In a dramatic series of events the House of Lords convened a panel of
Judges and submitted to them a series of questions, among them whether
“the Statute of Anne displaced the common law cause of action or authors
retained a perpetual property right in a copyrighted work despite statutory
limitations.”55 The judges found that such a common law right vested in
authors.56 However, the House of Lords rejected that finding, and instead

48. Id. at 208 (“The Act supposes an ownership at common law . . . . The sole property of
the owner is here acknowledged in express words, as a common law right: and the Legislature
who passed that Act, could never have entertained the most distant idea, ‘that the productions of
the brain were not a subject matter of property’.” To support an action on this statute, ownership
must be proved; or the plaintiff could not recover: because the action is to be brought by the
owner; who is to have a moiety of the penalty.”).
49. Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.) 846-47.
50. Id. at 837-39.
51. Millar, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. at 202.
52. Donaldson, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. at 938.
53. Id. at 839, 847 n.1.
54. Millar, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. at 202.
55. Donaldson, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. at 846-47.
56. Id. at 847.
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found that the common law’s perpetual copyright for literary works did not
exist, absent the statutory rights granted by the Statute of Anne.57
2.

Effect of Millar and Donaldson

The decision in Donaldson articulated the approaches that would form
the criteria used in assessing issues concerning copyright, including rights
at common law to perpetual copyrights versus limited copyrights
established by statute. In discussing whether a perpetual right of copyright
could accrue under the common law, the Donaldson court, mimicking the
Millar court, noted:
For a right at common law must be founded on principles of
conscience and natural justice. Conscience and natural justice are
not local, or municipal. Natural justice is the same at Athens, at
Rome, in France, Spain, and Italy. Copies of books have existed
in all ages and they have been multiplied; and yet an exclusive
privilege, or the sole right of one man to multiple copies, was
never dictated by natural justice in any age or country; and of
course the sole liberty of vending copies could not exist of
common right, which gives an equal benefit to all. An exclusive
privilege to exercise a natural faculty, is an encroachment upon the
rights of man.58
The remarks of the Donaldson court could not have predicted better the
continuing debates that accompany copyright, extensions of copyrights, and
the right of the public to have unfettered access to works that have fallen
into the public domain.59
What is equally compelling about the court’s decision in Donaldson, is
that it cites none other than John Milton in support of its decision to reverse
Millar, and finds the only rights an author has in his work are those
established by statute, in this case, the Statute of Anne.60 The court could,
arguably, have focused its analysis entirely on the instant legal issues at
57. Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding
the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1157 (1983) (citing 17 PARL.
HIST. ENG. 953, 970-71 (H.L. 1774)).
58. Donaldson, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. at 840.
59. The recent decision of Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012), however, makes even this
basic concept uncertain, as discussed infra.
60. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, c. 19 (Eng.). The Donaldson court articulates, “the
authority of such a man as Milton is of great weight; and he is represented as speaking, after much
consideration on the very point. His words are, the just retaining of each man’s copy, which God
forbid should be gainsaid.” Donaldson, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. at 843. The court goes on to assert
that, “But [Milton] does not say how long the copy should be retained . . . Milton could not wish
that PARADISE LOST, which was sold for £5 . . . should continue a splendid fortune in the hands of
a bookseller, and his own grand-daughter be obliged to beg a charity play.” Id. (emphasis added).
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hand before it, but instead it chose to recognize the force and importance of
a spokesperson of the nation, in the form of poet John Milton. This is an
extraordinary use of a literary figure by a court, and similarly, the court in
Donaldson also referenced author Jonathan Swift as a qualified source
regarding perpetual copyrights.61
C. DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT JURISPRUDENCE:
THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1790 AND WHEATON V. PETERS
The Framers of the Constitution largely followed suit when they
drafted the Copyright Act of 1790,62 which copied the Statute of Anne’s
twenty-eight year maximum copyright.63 But a significant question
remained as to whether the inclusion of the copyright clause in the Federal
Constitution disturbed any common law rights authors might enjoy under
the laws of the several states (including that of a perpetual copyright).64
Indeed, in FEDERALIST NO. 43 James Madison speaks of authors enjoying a
copyright at common law.65 Madison writes, “[t]he copyright of authors
has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common
law.”66 The future development of American copyright law was shaped by
both legal precedent and Congressional acts.
1.

The Case of Wheaton and the Making of United States’
Copyright Jurisprudence.

Any uncertainty as to the existence of a common law copyright vesting
in the author, even with the presence of statutory rights, was extinguished
with the case of Wheaton v. Peters.67 Wheaton involved the Supreme Court

61. Id. (“Dr. Swift and Mr. Pultney were both clearly of opinion, that there was no common
law right.”).
62. Act of May 31 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 [hereinafter Copyright Act of 1790].
63. J.A. Lorengo, What’s Good for the Goose is Good for the Gander: An Argument for the
Consistent Interpretation of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 51, 64 (2003).
64. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A
STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 219 (2002) (“[T]he language of the first copyright statute,
enacted in 1790, rather strongly suggests a perception by Congress that it was not creating a right
but rather affirming and protecting an existing right. Thus, it refers to the copyright of maps,
charts, and books already printed within the United States and to those who have legally acquired
the copyright of any such map, chart, book or books. This reference to an existing ‘copyright’ is
almost certainly to a perceived common-law right.” (citations omitted)).
65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 220 (James Madison) (2010), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
66. Id. Of course Madison would have been correct had only the Millar decision been
rendered by the time of the enactment of the first Copyright Act of 1790. However, it is
indeterminate whether he was aware of the Donaldson decision.
67. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654-55 (1834).
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reporter Henry Wheaton, who had taken care to compile substantial reports
from the Court’s terms, along with annotations.68 The significant cost of
these reports meant that they were beyond the reach of most lawyers.69
Richard Peters, Wheaton’s successor as court reporter undertook to
condense the material contained in Wheaton’s reports, and in the process
undercut the cost of Wheaton’s reports significantly.70
Wheaton
subsequently sued in Pennsylvania, and lost. He subsequently appealed to
the United States Supreme Court where he argued that he had a common
law right of copyright ownership in his works, in perpetuity.71 This was the
issue the Donaldson court had dealt with in 1774, and the United States
Supreme Court arrived at essentially the same result.72 While the Court
acknowledged that an author has certain common law rights which attach to
his work, that is vastly different from asserting “a perpetual and exclusive
property in the future publication of the work, after the author shall have
published it to the world.”73 But the Court certainly went further than this
mere acknowledgement, and foreclosed the possibility of recognizing rights
of a moral nature, as courts in France and other civil law jurisdictions had
been doing.74 Indeed, the Court asserts:
[t]he argument that a literary man is as much entitled to the
product of his labour as any other member of society, cannot be
controverted. And the answer is, that he realises this product by
the transfer of his manuscripts, or in the sale of his works, when
first published.75
Thus, the work of the author had already, even at this early stage of
copyright litigation in the United States, been reduced to that of
commodity.76
Finally, Wheaton established conclusively that the rights of authors
regarding copyright arise by statute, and not common law.77 The Court
noted “that Congress, then, by this act [the Copyright Act of 1790], instead

68. Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 593.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 654.
72. Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 846-47.
73. Id. at 657.
74. Davidson, supra note 12, at 609-10 (noting that after the French Revolution, courts
started providing more recognition to the creativity of authors).
75. Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 657.
76. Id. at 658. (“Does not the man who imitates the machine profit as much by the labour of
another, as he who imitates or republishes a book? Can there be a difference between the types
and press with which one is formed; and the instruments used in the construction of the others?”).
77. Id. at 657-58.
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of sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, created it. This seems to
be the clear import of the law, connected with the circumstances under
which it was enacted.”78 Thus, Wheaton established the analytic framework
for understanding author rights arising under the copyright laws, and
continues to stand for the premise that author rights are ones of a statutory
nature. Consequentially, absent a statutory grant of right for moral or other
rights, authorial rights are not likely to be found in the common law.79
2.

Statutory Modifications to United States Copyright Law

While the Millar decision ultimately did not yield a common law right
to perpetual copyright in an author’s work, the United States Congress may
have succeeded in circumventing that common law specter via statutory
means. Historically, since the Copyright Act of 1790, which granted a
copyright similar to that found under the Statute of Anne of a fixed period
of twenty-eight years (an initial term of fourteen years, with a renewable
copyright of fourteen years), the United States Congress has consistently
acted to extend the term of copyright protection granted under statute.80
With the Copyright Act of 1831, Congress extended the initial copyright
protection term to twenty-eight years, with a fourteen-year renewal, for a
total of forty-two years.81 With the Copyright Act of 1909, Congress again
acted to extend the term of copyright protections with an initial term of
twenty-eight years, followed by a renewal period of twenty-eight years, for
a total of fifty-six years.82 In the Copyright Act of 1976, the last major
revision to the copyright laws, Congress extended the term of copyright
protection (for works published after January 1, 1978) for fifty years
beyond the life of the author.83 The final revision to the term protections
under statute came with the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, which
extended copyright protections an additional twenty years, thus extending
78. Id. at 661. Accord Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431
(1984).
79. But see Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 381-93, 410-11 (discussing common law remedies
that are similar in nature to moral rights, but noting the uncertainty of their fate to achieve this
quasi-moral rights function in the aftermath of Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
539 U.S. 23 (2003)).
80. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124.; see also Sue Ann Mota, Eldred v.
Reno – Is the Copyright Term Extension Act Constitutional?, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 167, 169
(2002); Copyright Time: A History of Copyright in the United States, ASS’N OF RES. LIBRARIES,
http://www.arl.org/pp/ppcopyright/copyresources/copytimeline.shtml (last visited Oct. 31 2012)
(containing an extensive, and brief overview of the major copyright revisions, and cases
interpreting copyright law since the Copyright Act of 1790).
81. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 1-2 Stat. 436, 436. See also, ASS’N OF RES. LIBRARIES,
supra note 80.
82. The Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1-2, 35 Stat 1075, 1080.
83. The Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302, 90 Stat. 2541, 2573.
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the protections under the Copyright Act of 1976 for the life of the author
with an additional seventy years, and for works of corporate authorship
either one hundred-twenty years after creation, or ninety five years after
publication.84
What remains striking about Congress’ intent to protect the rights of
authors is its persistent resistance to fulfilling its mandate under the Berne
Convention to provide meaningfully for the moral rights of authors. 85 This
approach serves only the interests of those who have powerful incentives to
maintain a stranglehold on innovation by commercializing what is readily
adaptable for consumption, based on a faulty market-based approach that
values product-value over literary and artistic merit, discussed infra.86
3.

Defining Authorship and Moral Rights

Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson point out, “[l]ike ‘context,’
‘authorship’ is an elaborate work of framing, something we elaborately
produce rather than something we simply find.”87 Thus, authorship, moral
rights, and the role of the author in society are inextricably linked. This
section discusses these important interrelationships, and the important role
of the author in society.
a.

Role of Authorship

In his seminal 1969 essay What is an Author?, cultural theorist Michel
Foucault articulates a theory by which the function of the author is
subsumed beneath the larger functions of language that enable the
community to operate as a discourse.88 Thus, the function of the author
after assembling the final literary work is to disseminate it, at which point
the author ceases to exist.89 Foucault writes,
The author – or what I have called the ‘author-function’ – is
undoubtedly only one of the possible specifications of the subject
and, considering past historical transformations, it appears that the
form, the complexity, and even the existence of this function are
84. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827,
2827 (1998).
85. Robert C. Bird, Moral Rights: Diagnosis and Rehabilitation, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 407, 41621 (2009).
86. Ng, Author Rights, supra note 16, at 459-62.
87. Mieke Bal & Norman Bryson, Semiotics and Art History: A Discussion of Context and
Senders, in THE ART OF ART HISTORY: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 243, 252 (Donald Preziosi ed.,
2009).
88. Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in THE ART OF ART HISTORY: A CRITICAL
ANTHOLOGY 321, 324 (Donald Preziosi ed., 2009).
89. Id.
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far from immutable. We can easily imagine a culture where
discourse would circulate without any need for an author.90
In Foucault’s view, the author hardly stands as an iconic figure, absent
societal recognition of the author as such.91 Instead the author’s work
becomes a series of discourses by which we each communicate with one
another in the community.92 Such literary theories of understanding
authorship have ebbed and flowed in the academy, and much postmodern
literary theory seeks to elucidate and capture the essence of authorship and
discourse, often through a cultural perspective.93
But for the Framers of the Constitution, authors were individuals, and
their work had social significance as well as personal significance. Thus,
when one examines the copyright clause of the Federal Constitution, one
sees the significance of the functional value of author as author, “by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors.”94 The Federal
Constitution clearly connects the idea of limited, exclusive rights to authors
and inventors. Of course, as modern evolution of literary and other
creations has shown, such authors and inventors often take the shape of the
corporate body, as opposed to a natural person.95
Literary writers perform an important societal function, however. They
are a source of national pride and a symbol of influence around the world.96
And the process by which poets and writers arrive at their literary creations
is an arduous task, requiring the author to go into himself and recover from
the depths of his psyche the mappings of a novel, poem, or play that
examines, mirrors, and questions the contours of society. Indeed, as
Coleridge declared, “I see, not feel, how beautiful they are . . . . I may not
hope from outward forms to win, the Passion & the Life, whose Fountains
are within.”97 The author stands as an individual in relation to the entire

90. Id. at 333.
91. See, e.g., JAMES A. MACKIN, COMMUNITY OVER CHAOS:
AN ECOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE ON COMMUNICATION ETHICS 22-23 (1997).
92. Id.
93. Cf. Elana Gomel, Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray, and the (Un)Death of the
Author, NARRATIVE, at 74-92 (Jan. 2004) (for a general approach to discussing issues of
authorship from a theoretical and postmodern situationalism).
94. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
95. Paige Gold, Fair Use and the First Amendment: Corporate Control of Copyright is
Stifling Documentary-Making and Thwarting the Aims of the First Amendment, 15 U. BALT.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 21-23 (2006).
96. KIM C. STURGESS, SHAKESPEARE AND THE AMERICAN NATION 184 (2004).
97. JOHN WORTHEN, THE GANG: COLERIDGE, THE HUTCHINSONS & THE WORDSWORTHS IN
1802, at 153 (2001).
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community, and through the creative process is able to distill and unfold the
spectrum of society, its errors, failings, pathos, and possibilities.98
One can hardly think of England without recognizing the names of
Shakespeare, and Chaucer, or of France without thinking of Voltaire or
Sartre.99 Even in the United States, most individuals are apt to know the
legendary figure of Ernest Hemingway as big-game hunter, or his work THE
OLD MAN AND THE SEA, or Mark Twain’s HUCKLEBERRY FINN.100 And
the enduring importance of J.D. Salinger’s THE CATCHER IN THE RYE
cannot be overstated.101 The significance authors have to expose readers in
a particular community to each other is one of the foundational roles an
author serves – they help to explain and create fictions that we can then
adapt into our own lives, and ultimately make into our own stories. In
short, literature helps us to see one another, despite the inescapability of our
own prison-houses of perspective.
b.

Development of Moral Rights in Law

Despite the shared relations that the United States and Europe have had
since the founding of the Nation, very little of that shared history has
translated itself into an acceptance of moral rights in the United States.102
Moral rights (also known as droit moral) essentially recognize that a work
of literary art is inseparable from the personality of the author, and thus, the
author’s fundamental connection in the work cannot be severed by merely
transferring the copyrightable interests of their work.103 Instead, while the
publisher or other buyer of the work buys the right to reproduce the work,
the author continues to maintain a connection to the work, recognized by

98. See Norman Holland, The Power (?) of Literature: A Neuropsychological View, NEW
LITERARY HISTORY, Summer 2004, at 395-99 (discussing Coleridge, poetic insight, aesthetics,
and reader response to literature).
99. See Donald Morris, In Search of Lost Time, TIME (Nov. 21, 2007),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1686532,00 html (discussing the identity of
France as bound up in its cultural establishment [including writers], and its subsequent decline in
recent time).
100. See, e.g., Magazine Cover – Ernest Hemingway (Dec. 13, 1954), TIME,
http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19541213,00.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2012);
Picturing Hemingway, http://www npg.si.edu/exh/hemingway/ess-index2 htm (last visited Oct. 1,
2012); see also Adam Gopnik, The Man in the White Suit, NEW YORKER, Nov. 29, 2010, at 78.
101. Jonathan Yardley, J.D. Salinger’s Holden Caufield, Aging Gracelessly, WASH. POST,
Oct. 19, 2004, at C01. As well, the significance of THE CATCHER IN THE RYE might also be seen
in the fact that from 1990-1999 it was the tenth most challenged (banned) book in classrooms.
100 Most Frequently Challenged Books: 1990-1999, AM. LIBRARY ASS’N, http://www.ala.org/
ala/issuesadvocacy/banned/frequentlychallenged/challengedbydecade/1990_1999/index.cfm (last
visited Mar. 10, 2011).
102. Davidson, supra note 12, at 585-86.
103. Id. at 620.
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vested moral rights interests.104 The four traditional categories of moral
rights are the rights of attribution, integrity, disclosure, and withdrawal.
Specifically, the right of attribution, sometimes called the right of paternity,
recognizes the right (or not) of the author to choose to have their name
attached to their work.105 An author’s right to reject the gross modification
or distortion of their work, even after transferring their copyrightable
interests to another, is referred to as the right of integrity.106 The right of
disclosure allows the author to decide when the work is ready to be released
to the public.107 Finally, the right of withdrawal allows an author to decide
that the work is no longer representative of the author, and so demand that
the work be withdrawn from the commercial marketplace.108 Despite
claims moral rights are already protected under United States law, the
United States’ resistance to the Berne Convention evidences this deep
mistrust and aversion to moral rights.109
i.

History of the Berne Convention

The Berne Convention, initially completed in 1886, is a multilateral
treaty that is a major success in internationalizing and unifying protections
for works of literary and artistic expression. The underlying purpose of the
Berne Convention is to “demand that each member state accord to nationals
of other members the same level of copyright protection as it accords its
own nationals.”110 Thus, an author who publishes a work in France, and
who subsequently transfers certain rights to a publisher in the United States,
would presumably, absent an agreement to the contrary, retain their moral
rights in that literary work, despite the United States’ non-adherence to
moral rights as specified, pursuant to the Berne Convention. The Berne
Convention places authors at the center of its underlying purpose and
protections, indicating “[t]he countries of the Union, being equally
animated by the desire to protect, in as effective and uniform a manner as
possible, the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works.”111 The

104. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1091-92 (2003).
105. Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 363-64.
106. Id. at 364.
107. Id. at 362.
108. Id. at 362-63.
109. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853; see also Bird, supra note 85, at 408-09. As of 2013, there were 166 signatory states to the
Berne Convention. See Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. http://wipo.int/treaties/
en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15 (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
110. MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 4.03 (5th ed. 2006).
111. Berne Convention, supra note 18, pmbl.
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history leading up to the Convention makes this focus of the treaty even
more understandable.
Indeed, it is unsurprising that the Berne
Convention’s central motivation is the protection of author rights, as the
initial meetings which led to the actual negotiations of the Convention were
led by none other than Victor Hugo, who presided as president of the
l’Association littéraire et artistique internationale.112
For over a hundred years the United States refused to accede to the
Berne Convention. One of the major issues on which the United States
could not agree was the acceptance of moral rights, as embodied in Article
6bis of the Berne Convention.113 Indeed, as Amelia Vetrone notes,
In 1886, at the first signing of the Berne Treaty, the U.S.
representative was perfectly honest about the reasons the U.S. was
not signing the treaty. He issued a general declaration stating that,
while the U.S. agreed in principal with the idea of international
copyright protection, it saw immense obstacles to achieving it,
particularly the threat posed to American manufacturing interests
involved in the production of copyright works.114
This is because the United States’ interests at the time in pirating works of
British authors, among others, was too profitable to relinquish.115
Significantly, new technologies in the earlier part of the twentieth century
made it increasingly difficult to agree on revisions of copyright law,
including those relating to the Berne Convention.116 In 1988, not being a
member of the Berne Convention made it increasingly difficult for the
United States to protect its global economic interests, especially with the
advent of videocassette piracy.117 In an effort to protect the United States
against global piracy of its creative works, it acceded to the Berne
Convention.118 Limiting the application of the treaty provisions, the United
States stipulated that its copyright laws and the common law sufficiently
112. AMELIA VETRONE, THE LEGAL AND MORAL RIGHTS OF ALL ARTISTS 21 (2003); see
also ARNOLD P. LUTZKER, CONTENT RIGHTS FOR CREATIVE PROFESSIONALS: COPYRIGHTS AND
TRADEMARKS IN A DIGITAL AGE 158 (2d ed. 2002) (“The Berne Convention was inspired by
Victor Hugo and the French intellectuals of the mid-19th century, who believed the individual
author was being denied fair economic return on the fruits of his or her creativity.”).
113. LUTZKER, supra note 112, at 160.
114. VETRONE, supra note 112, at 49.
115. Id. at 49-50. (“As it turned out, the United States was the most prolific copyright pirate
in the world. It not only refused to enact any laws to protect foreign authors, but it actually
appeared to encourage piracy. It seems that for one hundred years after the enactment of the first
copyright statute in this country, American publishers were printing and selling copies of books by
foreign authors, particularly British authors, without paying any royalties to them.”).
116. Id. at 49-51.
117. Id. at 52.
118. EPSTEIN, supra note 110, § 4.03.
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protected the interests identified in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention,
such that it need not be bound by that provision.119 Moreover, because it
was classified as a non-self-executing treaty, the Berne Convention needed
to be implemented by act of Congress in order to become enforceable
law.120
The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 specifically
disavows Article 6bis of the Berne Convention.121 Section 3(b) of the
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 states:
(b) CERTAIN RIGHTS NOT AFFECTED. – The provisions of the
Berne Convention, the adherence of the United States thereto, and
satisfaction of United States obligations thereunder, do not expand
or reduce any right of an author of a work, whether claimed under
Federal, State, or the common law – (1) to claim authorship of the
work; or (2) to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the work,
that would prejudice the author’s honor or reputation.122
Thus, the effect of section 3(b) of the Berne Convention Implementation
Act of 1988 effectively froze the status quo of author rights in the United
States.
ii.

The Promise and Reality of Moral Rights in the
United States

Moral rights, absent narrow provisions in state legislation and Visual
Artist Rights Act [VARA], are not recognized in the United States.123
While commentators and the United States Congress sought to distance
itself from the idea that it was not fully complying with Berne when it
acceded to the treaty, these promises have, arguably, proved illusory. If the

119. See Edward J. Damich, Moral Rights in the United States and Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention: A Comment on the Preliminary Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S.
Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 COLUM. VLA-J.L. & ARTS 655, 655 (1985) (noting that
the United States’ compliance with article 6bis of the Berne Convention was likely due more to
non-compliance by other Berne signatories, than United States common law or other statutory law
satisfying its requirements); see also VETRONE, supra note 112, at 51 (noting the powerful
corporate media interests who lobbied the United States Congress against adopting Article 6bis of
the Berne Convention).
120. Berne Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2, 102 Stat. 2853, 2853;
JOHN MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 468 (5th ed. 2007).
121. Berne Implementation Act of 1988, § 3(b)(1)-(2).
122. Id.
123. See generally Visual Artist Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006). The scope of
protection afforded under VARA is limited, and only applies to visual works of art. Id. However,
it does represent a limited attempt to introduce Federally protected moral rights for unique, artistic
creations.
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United States was, in fact, in compliance with the Berne Convention, and
truly believed its laws compatible with the requirements under Article 6bis
of the Berne Convention, then why take such concerted effort to distance
itself from the language and effects of that provision of the treaty? The
most logical answer is that such rights are simply not yet fully compatible
with the way business is done in the United States. Instead, the United
States’ system of copyright commodifies the author’s work, such that when
authors transfer their copyright in their work, any subsequent rights they
might have concerning that work take second-class status to the economic
primacy of exploitation of their creative works.124
However, the United States relentlessly suggested in its ratification that
it was in compliance with the Berne Convention by relying primarily on
existing copyright laws (then the Copyright Law of 1976) and the common
law of the United States.
However, this specious suggestion that the common law of the United
States is sufficient to protect moral rights undermines the Berne
Convention, and offers an illusory salve to authors seeking to effectuate
their moral rights. Specifically, the Berne Convention, as an international
treaty, executed under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, is the law of every
state of the United States.125 However, the common law of the United
States is particular to every state in the Union, and thus subject to the
whims of that particular forum state’s interpretation of its own laws as they
apply to the Berne Convention.126 Such an understanding of common law
and copyright was early established in Wheaton, which forcefully declared
that there was no federal common law, especially as it pertained to
copyright.127 Thus, the United States’ approach to the Berne Convention is
arguably one that does great disservice to that treaty’s desire for uniformity
in the protection of author rights.128 By allowing piecemeal development
under the common law, with the various predilections of various forums to
approach the Berne Convention and the United States’ obligations under
them as they pertain (or don’t) to moral rights, seems a particularly
124. See Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author
Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347, 368-70 (1993) [hereinafter Netanel,
Copyright Alienability Restrictions].
125. U.S. CONST., art. 6, § 2.
126. See, e.g., William P. Johnson, Understanding Exclusion of the CISG: A New Paradigm
of Determining Party Intent, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 213, 215 (2011) (discussing the imprecise analysis
by state and federal courts of the binding, by virtue of the Federal Constitution’s Supremacy
Clause, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”)).
127. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654-55 (1834).
128. Berne Convention, supra note 18, pmbl.
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haphazard way to enforce an international treaty, with uniformity at its
heart.
The VARA, enacted in 1990, explicitly does establish moral rights in
extraordinarily limited circumstances.129 Under VARA, visual authors only
have (and, indeed can only claim such rights during their lifetimes), the
right of attribution and integrity, and not the other traditional rights of
disclosure and withdrawal.130 This Act suggests that moral rights are not
adequately guaranteed under the common law, nor under the provisions of
United States copyright law. Further, the limited amount of authors to
which this act applies, including only those who create a visual work
produced in small quantities, serves as a considerable statement of the
continuing vitality of resistance to moral rights on a larger scale, and
ultimately a frustration of the Berne Convention.131 Even under the
substantial proscriptions under VARA, and its concomitant protections for
visual authors, there have been significant limitations imposed.132
Moral rights stand as separate rights from those arising under
traditional Anglo-American views of copyright.133 This is why looking to
doctrines of tort and contract law, while potentially powerful devices to
cure breaches of an author’s agreement with their publisher, or to protect
against personal defamation or other significant violations of the author’s
work, are arguably insufficient compared to the protections served by moral
rights. This is particularly evident when Anglo-American views of
copyright are compared to the moral rights authors are entitled to under the
Berne Convention, or in foreign jurisdictions such as France and
Germany.134 In the final analysis, the approach that the United States has
129. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006). See also EPSTEIN, supra note 110, § 4.03 (“Since [the
enactment of Berne Convention], the U.S. Congress has enacted explicit “moral rights”
protections for a limited class of visual artists. However artists not covered by this statute,
including creators of literary, musical, and audio visual works, must continue to look to other
sources of U.S. law to protect these interests. The language of The Berne Convention
Implementation Act explicitly states that membership in the Convention is not evidence of a
recognition by the U.S. of a higher degree of moral rights protection than that already afforded by
the Copyright Act.”).
130. Id.; see Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 356.
131. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories:” Narrative’s Implications for Moral
Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 26-32 (2001).
132. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 143 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that
VARA did not apply to site-specific work of artist in park, thus allowing removal of a sculpture);
see also Daniel Grant, When Creator and Owner Clash, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703447004575449793518169052 html?KEYWO
RDS=ascalon.
133. See Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in
United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 24-26 (1992)
[hereinafter Netanel, United States and Continental Copyright Law]; see also, Ng, The Social
Contract and Authorship, supra note 13, at 463-65.
134. Netanel, United States and Continental Copyright Law, supra note 133, at 23-48.
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taken reflecting both its historic and contemporary unwillingness to adopt
robust provisions pertaining to moral rights, and its enactment of the narrow
VARA protections for a limited group of artists, does little more than to
exemplify an approach that demeans the culturally important position that
creators of artistic works of literary merit ought to occupy in the collective
intellectual and cultural wealth of the nation, in favor of one which values at
its core commercialization.
III. ECONOMIC, MORAL, AND PUBLIC INTERESTS, AND THE
ROLE OF THE LITERARY CONTRACT
An astonishing number of new books and reprints of previously
published books are published in the United States each year.135
Accordingly, as literary contracts are then negotiated in such a large
capacity in the United States, this section addresses the need to consider
various rights to which authors are entitled, relevant case law, and the
further role of literary contracts.
A. ECONOMICS, MORAL RIGHTS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The debate in this country turns on the interests between economic,
moral, and public rights. Typically this debate is framed in terms of John
Locke’s theory of labor and ownership, a form of natural rights theory, for
which a more modern understanding is that of an author possessing a series
of rights under the collective umbrella of the work of literature itself.136
Locke argued that whenever an individual puts his own creative forces into
nature and produces something, then the rights of ownership in the thing
produced naturally accrue to him as a result of those independent labors.137
This view does not conflict with the theory arising under modern economics
which puts the locus of interest on the contractual arrangement between a
seller of goods (the work of literature) and a buyer of those goods (the
distributor). It is only natural that such a transfer of ownership, or the rights
to use those goods, necessarily entails a right of use that might preclude the
original seller (the author) of doing what he would potentially have liked to
have done with the thing sold, subsequent to the transaction. However,
135. See, e.g., Bowker-Publishing Market Shows Steady Title Growth in 2011 Fueled
Largely by Self-Publishing Sector, BOWKER (June 5, 2012), http://www.bowker.com/enUS/aboutus/press_room/2012/pr_06052012.shtml. Even excluding the high amount of selfpublishing reported, the number of literary works published is amazingly high. Particularly given
the declining levels of readership in this digital age). But see Caleb Crain, Twilight of the Books,
NEW YORKER (Dec. 24, 2007), http://www newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2007/12/24/
071224crat_atlarge_crain.
136. See Ng, The Social Contract and Authorship, supra note 13, at 459-61.
137. Id. at 459.
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nothing thus far stated regarding these transactions is in direct conflict with
moral rights, unless the ultimate buyer of the work wishes to use it in a way
that is deleterious to the author’s reputation, or the integrity of the work
itself.
All of the aforementioned moral rights, embody traditional moral
rights: (1) the author of a work has an inseparable interest, and absolute
right to have their name attached (or not) to their personal creation; and (2)
the work itself has some inviolate attribute that no one, except the author,
should be able to manipulate. In doing either of these things, the intrinsic
(though not necessarily commercial) value of the work is (potentially)
destroyed, or irredeemably distorted, and potentially the author’s ability to
claim the work as their own is diminished or precluded, because the author
can no longer truly take an authentic sense of ownership in the work.138 Of
course these rights could potentially be seen as injurious to economic
returns, because under a moral rights theory regime the author retains a
vested interest in the work that could infringe upon the distributor’s ability
to use the work in a particular way that it would like, but one for which the
author might have a valid claim (under a moral rights regime) to block
through injunctive relief, or to prevail in a cause for damages. This is not
necessarily a negative thing, even though we are so often accustomed to
seeing issues through an economically oriented paradigm, and so often
recognize short-term values as more substantial than long-term ones.139
The long-term value in having works of art that have their integrity,
and attribution of the author intact, are manifold. They ensure that the work
of the artistic creator whose creation is to be distributed into the commons
of knowledge is one that meets with the author’s expectations, and that the
work is as the author intended it. That is not to say that works could not be
improved once they enter the stream of commerce, but the value and
primacy of intellectual products of the nation’s artists and writers has, in the
long-term, greater value than that which is motivated by improvement for
short-term commercial gains.140
No other author embodies this approach better than William
Shakespeare. He is well known around the world, his plays are consistently
(and often) performed, edition after edition of his work continues to appear,
and he is deceased, thus unable to enjoy the economic or public
remunerations from his remarkable work, especially since all of his creative
138. Id. at 486-88 (discussing “authentic authorship”); see also Ng, Authors and Readers,
supra note 30, at 400-03.
139. Id. at 415.
140. Cf. Ng, The Social Contract and Authorship, supra note 13, at 493-94 (noting potential
dangers when authors create without an authentic or ethical end).
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works are in the public domain. How many careers in theater, cinema,
academia, and the infinite series of subsidiary industries his works have
created is unknown, but the integrity of his works is one that continues to be
fiercely protected by scholars devoted to his life and career.141 He is as
much a national treasure of Great Britain, and a symbol of the height of
intellectual achievement, as he is an extraordinary addition to the Western
canon of English literature.142 Yet, in Shakespeare’s own lifetime he seems
to have cared little about the editions that were churned out of his works,
much to the disgruntlement of scholars who try to piece together what is
Shakespeare, from what is not.143 And while we have no knowledge of
what Shakespeare’s approach would have been to moral rights, the longterm value that has accrued over the centuries concerning his work is that
they have far more social, aesthetic, and commercial worth intact in their
integrity, and attributed to him, than if they were just passing works of
literature that had been relentlessly distorted for profit, without an author.
Commercialization, in the short-term, is by its nature not designed to work
for the benefit of the long-term values of the community, or the intrinsic
literary merit of a work of art.144
The Framers recognized the importance of these long-term interests of
society over the short-term value of commercial interests when they drafted

141. A more contemporary example of this rigorous debate occurred with a claim by scholar
Donald Foster (known for his use of computer analysis in ascertaining authorship), of the
discovery of a new poem, that he attributed to Shakespeare. See William S. Niederkorn, A
Scholar Recants on His ‘Shakespeare’ Discovery, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2002),
http://query nytimes.com/gst/fullpage html?res=9903E5DD143FF933A15755C0A9649C8B63.
142. Stephen Greenblatt, one of the foremost literary scholars of our era suggests in his
biography of Shakespeare, WILL AND THE WORLD: HOW SHAKESPEARE BECAME SHAKESPEARE
12 (2005) that, “This is a book, then, about an amazing success story that has resisted explanation:
it aims to discover the actual person who wrote the most important body of imaginative literature
of the last thousand years.” And Shakespeare’s contemporary rival, the important English poet
Ben Jonson, wrote in a prefatory poem to the First Folio that, “He was not of an age, but for all
time!”
143. Debates center not only on what works have actually been authored, or which have not,
but also who ought to be ascribed authorship to the works that we typically attribute to
Shakespeare as Shakespeare. See, e.g, Robert McCrum, Review: Shakespeare Revealed,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2007/apr/22/classics.biography.
See generally Printing Shakespeare, BRITISH LIBRARIES, http://www.bl.uk/treasures/shakespeare/
printingshakes html (last visited Mar. 10, 2011); BRIAN VICKERS, COUNTERFEITING
SHAKESPEARE: EVIDENCE, AUTHORSHIP, AND JOHN FORD’S FUNERALL ELEGYE (2002); see also
Jess Bravin, Justice Stevens Renders an Opinion on Who Wrote Shakespeare’s Plays, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 18, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123998633934729551 html.
144. Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions, supra note 124, at 441. “Schopenhauer
believed that, ‘[w]riting for money and reservation of copyright are, at bottom, the ruin of
literature. No one writes anything worth writing, unless he writes entirely for the sake of his
subject.” Id. (quoting Arthur Schopenhauer, On Authorship, in ESSAYS 13 (T. Bailey Saunders
trans., 1951)).
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the Federal Constitution’s copyright clause.145 Following in the formidable
footsteps of their British counterparts, they sought to provide for limited
terms of protection for original authorial creations, like works of literary
art.146 Those protections walked the fine line between valuing the
individual’s right to economic exploitation of the fruits of his intellectual
labor, while acknowledging the fundamental and overriding interest the
public has to advancing – in effect – the wealth of the nation.147 In
assessing these three interests: economic, moral rights, and the public
interest in knowledge, the Framers made an implicit recognition that
knowledge never (or at least should never) halt at a particular place, never
to develop or grow again, but rather that each contribution by each author
was a further step in the overall process to civilization’s growth and
development.148 However, this process has arguably been stunted by the
relentless commercialization of the literary marketplace at the expense of
works of literary art.149 And it has done so at the expense of author’s moral
rights, which seems untenable, given the larger societal interests that the
community has in the collective wealth of intellectual achievements and
creations of its authors.
B. FORECLOSING THE DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES: DASTAR,
ELDRED, AND GOLAN
In 2003, the United States Supreme Court laid the foundation for future
moral rights litigation involving authors and their creative works. In three
distinct opinions, the court shaped the current role of literary contracts. The
following text discusses the background and effect of those decisions.

145. Davidson, supra note 12, at 602-03. “When the Founding Fathers drafted the
Constitution, their purpose in including the Copyright clause was to implement, as the British had,
a ‘public benefit rationale for copyright protection.’” (quoting Craig W. Dallon, The Problem
with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring Public Interest, 44 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 365, 423 (2004)).
146. Id.
147. Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright
Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1315-16 (2003).
148. Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 n.10 (1984)
(“In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider . . . two questions: First, how much will the
legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public, and, second, how much will the
monopoly granted be detrimental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the
proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the
temporary monopoly.” (citations omitted)).
149. Natalie C. Suhl, Note, Moral Rights Protection in the United States Under the Berne
Convention: A Fictional Work?, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203, 1214-15
(2002).

2012]

CREATING THE NATIONAL WEALTH
1.

189

Dastar – Closing the Door to Moral Rights Claims

The issue of moral rights, copyright, and length of copyright protection
terms are inextricably intertwined. Each represents aspects of the economic
interests of the author and distributor, the moral interests of the author, and
the public’s interest in the protection of works, chiefly, though not
exclusively as: economic (author and distributor), moral (author), and
length of protection (public). Accordingly, some commentators have
suggested that while moral rights are not explicitly recognized as a cause of
action under United States law, certain aspects of the common law, or other
statutes might be used to prevail in a way that provides a cause of action
similar to that of moral rights.150 Two important moral rights – attribution
and integrity – attained a kind of quasi-enforceable status in the United
States, under the Lanham Act.151 The Lanham Act protects consumers
against false or misleading advertising, and also includes protections
against trademark infringement, and trademark dilution.152 The provisions
for which authors seeking a cause of action for attribution and integrity
were invoked under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.153
As Natalie C. Suhl notes, these provisions of the Lanham Act had been
invoked because,
Moral Rights protection is limited in the United States, where the
only viable course of action for non-visual authors is through the
Lanham Act. Regarding both the Right of Attribution and the
Right of Integrity, the Lanham Act provides only limited
protection. . . . Thus, authors garner protection only where overt
mutilations occur to the extent that the character of the work is
changed so as to present a false designation of origin. Mutilation

150. See generally Michael B. Gunlicks, A Balance of Interests: The Concordance of
Copyright Law and Moral Rights in the Worldwide Economy, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 601, 618-32 (2001).
151. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2006).
152. Id.
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(“(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of
fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which – (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion,
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”).
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of a work, therefore, which does not confuse the public’s view of
its origin, would not be actionable under the Lanham Act.154
Thus, under these provisions of the Lanham Act, works which were
distorted to a point which might cause deception, or which had purported a
source of false origin might run afoul of the Lanham Act and subsequently
achieve the fulfillment of quasi-moral rights enforcement. Such moral
rights were otherwise almost elusively evaded by the United States
Congress despite its accession to the Berne Convention.
The Supreme Court in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp Corp.,155 however, effectively ended the use of the Lanham Act to
achieve this purpose, and in the process significantly closed the door to
other moral rights claims under other bodies of national law.156 In Dastar,
the Supreme Court faced the question of “whether § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), prevents the unaccredited copying of a work.”157
The facts in Dastar surrounded the use of a television series, “Crusade in
Europe,” that had been based on a book by General Dwight D.
Eisenhower.158 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation (“Fox”) had been
granted exclusive television rights to create the series “Crusade in Europe,”
based upon Eisenhower’s books.159 It in turn contracted with Time, Inc. to
produce the series, and Time in turn assigned its copyright to the series it
produced to Fox.160 The filmed series included footage created by members
of the United States military forces, the British Ministry of Information, and
other cameramen.161
While the publisher Doubleday, of General
Eisenhower’s book, CRUSADE IN EUROPE, renewed its copyright prior to its
expiration, Fox did not renew their copyright to the television series
“Crusade in Europe.”162 Thus, the copyright held by Fox to the television
series lapsed, and entered the public domain in 1977.163 “In 1988, Fox
reacquired the television rights in General Eisenhower’s book, including the
exclusive right to distribute the Crusade television series on video and to
sublicense others to do so.”164 In 1995 “Dastar released a video set entitled
154. Suhl, supra note 149, at 1203.
155. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
156. Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 409-12 (discussing the effect that Dastar has had on other
potential claims for moral rights, under other bodies of law).
157. Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 25.
158. Id. at 25-26.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 26.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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World War II Campaigns in Europe.”165 To make “World War II
Campaigns in Europe,” Dastar purchased tapes of the original version of the
“Crusade in Europe” television series, copied them, and subsequently edited
them.166 As part of this process, they made the series significantly shorter
than the original, and inserted a variety of modest changes, including voice
over narrations, and a new credits page.167
Fox subsequently brought an action asserting that Dastar’s sale of its
own video series (based substantially on the original “Crusade in Europe”
series), had infringed Doubleday’s copyright in General Eisenhower’s
book, and thus, subsequently, Fox’s exclusive television rights, which
flowed from the book, without proper attribution, thus constituted “reverse
passing off,” actionable under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.168 The
District Court found for Fox on all of the counts of its allegations, and
judgment was subsequently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
who in their analysis of the issue concluded, “Dastar copied substantially
the entire Crusade in Europe series created by Twentieth Century Fox,
labeled the resulting product with a different name and marked it without
attribution to Fox [, and] therefore committed a ‘bodily appropriation’ of
Fox’s series.”169
Dastar then was essentially a moral rights claim, masquerading as a
trademark infringement suit under the Lanham Act. And the Supreme
Court correctly identified it as such in a unanimous opinion.170 The opinion
was written by Justice Antonin Scalia, reversing the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit, concluding:
[A]s used in the Lanham Act, the phrase ‘origin of goods’ is in our
view incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated the
ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain. Such an
extension would not only stretch the text, but it would be out of
accord with the history and purpose of the Lanham Act and
inconsistent with precedent.171
What the Court did was to make clear to prospective litigants that claims
and remedy for attribution are to be found in copyright law, and not under
the auspices of the Lanham Act’s trademark protections.172 Moreover, the
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 27-28 (emphasis added).
Id. at 38 (noting that Justice Breyer did not take part in the consideration of the case).
Id. at 32.
Id. at 32-35; see also Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 410.
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Court noted that “[t]he rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a
‘carefully crafted bargain,’ . . . under which, once the patent or copyright
monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and
without attribution.”173 Finally, the Court effectively closed the door to any
moral rights claims, attempting to establish themselves under a quasicommon law rights claim. In discussing Fox’s claim under the Lanham
Act, Scalia made mention of VARA, writing,
When Congress has wished to create such an addition to the law of
copyright, it has done so with much more specificity than the
Lanham Act’s ambiguous use of ‘origin.’ The Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 . . . [provides for an] express right of
attribution [and] is carefully limited and focused . . . Recognizing
in § 43(a) a cause of action for misrepresentation of authorship of
noncopyrighted works (visual or otherwise) would render these
limitations superfluous. A statutory interpretation that renders
another statute superfluous is of course to be avoided.174
Scalia’s reference to VARA suggested that absent express Congressional
creation of statutory rights for copyright (which it presumably would do so
expressly and statutorily), the courts are not the venue for the establishment
of these rights. This interpretation necessarily suggests that Congress’
assurances that the common law and other laws of the United States are
sufficient to meet the requirements of the Berne Convention will be hollow,
in that courts will now look closely to see if the rights being asserted are of
a moral nature, and thus excluded (absent the narrow provisions under
VARA) from compensability, if pursued as a claim arising under
copyright.175 Of course such a result is not entirely surprising, given the
declaration by the Court in Wheaton that rights of holders arising under
copyright law are necessarily statutory, and thus within the purview of
Congress, and not the common law.176 All of this reinforces the underlying
recognition that allusions to other law and common law for the protection
of specific rights, in this case authorial moral rights, is no substitution for
statutory law intended to effectuate that purpose.

173. Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 33-35 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989)).
174. Id. at 34-35
175. See Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 410.
176. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654-55 (1834).
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Eldred – An Erosion of the Public Interest

The case to consider in tandem with Dastar is Eldred v. Ashcroft,177
which involved a challenge to the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998
(“CTEA”), on grounds that it exceeded Congress’s authority under the
copyright clause of the Federal Constitution and also violated the First
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.178 The CTEA granted extensions
on copyright terms in the United States by twenty years.179 Thus, it
extended works copyrighted by natural authors from the life of the author,
and fifty years, to the life of the author and seventy years.180 Works of
corporate authorship were also extended to either one hundred and twenty
years after their creation or ninety-five years after their publication.181 The
bill was subsequently passed by a voice vote in both houses of Congress,
and signed into law by then President William Clinton.182 In Eldred, the
petitioners argued, inter alia, “the CTEA’s extension of existing copyrights
does not ‘promote the Progress of Science’ as contemplated by the
preambular language of the Copyright Clause. . . . they maintain that the
preambular language identifies the sole end to which Congress may
legislate.”183 Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself and six other Justices
rejected the Petitioner’s argument claiming the CTEA was
unconstitutional.184 Instead they found such authority to determine
copyright terms and limits vests solely in Congress. “As petitioners point
out, we have described the Copyright Clause as ‘both a grant of power and
a limitation[.]’”185 Thus, Ginsburg’s reasoning in her analysis of whether
Congress had exceeded its authority under the copyright clause declared
that, “We have also stressed, however, that it is generally for Congress, not
the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s
objectives.”186 However, what is most troubling about Ginsburg’s analysis
177. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). While the petitioners in Eldred asserted other theories (e.g.,
violations of the First amendment) that Congress had exceeded its authority under the copyright
clause in extending copyrights under the Copyright Term Extension Act, the authority of Congress
to extend the term is the only issue that will be addressed here.
178. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193-94.
179. See 1 LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 1:9 (3d ed. 2010).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211-12 (2003). (“The CTEA’s extension of existing
copyrights categorically fails to “promote the Progress of Science,” petitioners argue, because it
does not stimulate the creation of new works but merely adds value to works already created”);
see also Lawrence A. Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1065
(2001).
184. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221-22.
185. Id. at 212 (quoting Granham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)).
186. Id.
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is her repeated rejection of the overarching public interests that the
copyright clause is intended to preserve, with its explicit language
concerning the limited term of copyright protection.187 In responding to
Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice Stephen Breyer who each dissented
separately in Eldred, Ginsburg states,
JUSTICE STEVENS’ characterization of reward to the author as a
‘secondary consideration’ of copyright law . . . understates the
relationship between such rewards and the ‘Progress of Science.’
As we have explained ‘the economic philosophy behind the
[Copyright] [C]lause . . . is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.188
Thus, Ginsburg concludes in Eldred, “as we read the Framers’ instruction,
the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to determine the intellectual
property regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the ends
of the Clause.”189
While the decision in Eldred causes concern that works might,
depending on Congressional judgment, never pass into the public domain
for the good of society, what is especially striking is the vehement language
and dangerously anti-public interest analysis Ginsburg employed to respond
to Stevens and Breyer’s concerns.190 One wonders, based upon the
language employed by Ginsburg extolling the substantial deference
Congress enjoys in areas of copyright law, whether any lengthy grant of
copyright protection would run afoul of the ‘limited times’ requirement of
the Federal Constitution.191 However, Eldred has received vast praise and
criticism.192 For example, Representative Mary Bono, a proponent of the
CTEA, spoke out regarding her support for the bill on the floor of the
House of Representatives, in the United States Congress. Representative
Bono stated , “Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright protection to last
forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the
Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to strengthen our
copyright laws in all of the ways available to us.”193 One wonders whether
187. Id.
188. Id. at 212 n.18.
189. Id. at 222.
190. Id. at 221-22.
191. Id. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The express grant of a perpetual copyright would
unquestionably violate the textual requirement that the authors’ exclusive rights be only “for
limited times’” (emphasis added)).
192. Id. at 207 n.15.
193. 144 CONG. REC. H9952 (1998) (statement of Rep. Bono); see also Lessig, supra note
183, 1065-66.
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the Court that decided Eldred wouldn’t have lent a sympathetic ear to the
concerns of Representative Bono, especially in light of their apparent
adoption of the ideology that “copyright law celebrates the profit
motive.”194
3.

Golan v. Holder – A Final Erosion of the Rights of the Public

The most recent development in the United States Supreme Court’s
refusal to acknowledge the primacy of the public domain, of writers, and
the necessity of author’s moral rights, is the case of Golan v. Holder.195
The outcome of the case was 7-2, with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg once
again being assigned an important copyright clause decision, and Justice
Stephen Breyer writing a dissent, in which Justice Samuel Alito
concurred.196 The case merits discussion in this article because it forms,
along with Dastar and Eldred an important trilogy of cases in which the
Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that any statutory rights, for writers
(including, inter alia, moral rights) must be statutory, and significantly, that
the rights and interests of the public to the shared national wealth that
writers and artists contribute to the fabric of society is also statutory, which
must be guaranteed by Congress and not through constitutional protections
as interpreted by the Court, arguably rendering the Court’s duty to ensure
the protections inherent in the copyright clause for both author and public a
dead letter.197
At issue in Golan were restored copyrights granted to foreign works
that were currently in the public domain. In order for, as articulated in the
case, the United States to be in full compliance with the Berne Convention,
it was necessary for Congress to enact Section 514 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act,
which grants copyright protection to preexisting works of Berne
member countries, protected in their country of origin, but lacking
protection in the United States . . . As a consequence of the
barriers to U.S. copyright protection prior to the enactment of §
514, foreign works ‘restored’ to protection by the measure had
entered the public domain in this country.198

194. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 213.
195. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
196. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 873.
197. Id. at 888. “[W]e explained, the Clause ‘empowers Congress to determine the
intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the ends of the
Clause.’” Id. (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 878.
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As this Article has repeatedly stressed, however, the United States has not
achieved full Berne implementation due to its resistance to the acceptance –
through statutory means – of author’s moral rights. Equally significant with
Golan, however, is the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the public’s interest to
works that were in the public domain, and which had been freely enjoyed
by the members of the public. With the passage of Section 514, works that
had previously been enjoyed freely (without the requisite of a royalty
payment), would revert to a state of copyright protection through statutory
restoration of their protected status, thus requiring schools, orchestras,
charitable groups, among others, to be required to pay up, or not perform
the work that they had been able to freely do prior to the law’s
enactment.199 The Court notes that Congress in passing section 514,
included cushions for users of works previously freely available. However,
this does not change the fact that once the period of applicability for those
cushions ends, so too does the ability to freely use and disseminate the nowcopyrighted work.200
In challenging Congress’ authority to enact section 514, the Petitioners
in Golan argued that Congress had exceeded both its authority under the
copyright clause, unilaterally deciding to remove works that had been
enjoyed in the public domain and restoring them to copyrighted status, and,
moreover, that Congress had violated the First Amendment.201 The
argument implicating the First Amendment is a fascinating approach to
dealing with cases in which Congress has excessively guaranteed profit
over the rights of the public through, inter alia, enormous terms of
copyright protection, and restored a significant number of works to
protection from their prior resting place in the public domain. 202 This
Article, however, addresses only the argument petitioners advanced in
arguing Congress exceeded its authority under the copyright clause.
The Court’s decision summarily deals with the copyright clause
argument and suggests that the interests advanced by the Petitioner
mirrored those addressed in Eldred.203 Once again, utilizing a troubled
form of logic, the Court dismissed the Petitioners’ claim that there was
anything “unlimited” about the duration or restoration of copyright

199. Id. at 893 (noting that works that could previously be used for free must now, after the
passage of section 514, be obtained in the marketplace like any other copyrighted work).
200. Id. at 882-83.
201. Id. at 883.
202. Cf. id. at 904 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Apparently there are no precise figures about the
number of works the Act affects, but in 1996 the then-Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters,
thought that they ‘probably number in the millions.’”).
203. Id. at 884-85 (majority opinion).
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protection afforded by Congress through its enactment of Section 514.204
However, it is not at all certain that the question presented by Golan can be
dispositive in light of Eldred. For one, Eldred dealt with a lengthening of
copyright terms, thus raising the question that whether such extraordinary
grants of copyright term protections by Congress were such that a work
could ever lapse into the public domain, such that Congress would violate
the language of limitation – “limited Times” – expressly stated in the
Federal Constitution.
In Golan, however, the logic and issue shifts – because the works at
issue in Golan were already within the public domain, thus necessitating
Congress resurrecting these foreign works from free use and placing them
within the protection of U.S. copyright law. It is questionable whether any
duration of time afforded by Congress to protect a copyrighted work would
ever run afoul of the Court’s rationale. However, as seen in Golan, if
Congress can withdraw works from the public domain at will, and grant
copyright protection to some date fixed in the future, it seems that the
purpose and restraints imposed by the Founders on terms of copyright
protection would be rendered meaningless. In effect, these extensions
would permit Congress to grant in substance – though not in name – a
perpetual copyright. The Court avoids this conclusion largely on two
grounds. First, the terms of protection granted by Congress are not
unlimited, in that they do – whether it be the lifetime of the author or
decades – have, in an abstract sense, a quantifiable limit to their duration.205
Second, Congress, not the court, is charged with determining the copyright
laws that will best advance the demands of the Federal Constitution, and so
changes in copyright – including advancing interests of authors and the
public – must be made through statutory means, and not through the
courts.206
However, Justice Breyer’s dissent articulates appropriately the costs
that section 514 will have on the Nation. As he states it, “[i]f a school
orchestra or other nonprofit organization cannot afford the new charges, so
be it. They will have to do without – aggravating the already serious
problem of cultural education in the United States.”207 Moreover, Justice
Breyer notes that individuals wishing to use these now restored works often
face the arduous requirements of searching for the copyright holders
(especially if they are orphan works) of these previously freely available

204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 885.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 905 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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works. Such searches entail, “[u]nusually high administrative costs [that]
threaten to limit severely the distribution of those works – works which,
despite their characteristic lack of economic value, can prove culturally
invaluable.”208 Such questions are, in Justice Breyer’s dissent, best
addressed by the judicial branch. As he posits it, “the question is whether
the Copyright Clause permits Congress to seriously exacerbate such a
problem by taking works out of the public domain without a countervailing
benefit.
This question is appropriate for judicial resolution.”209
Unfortunately, the Court has adopted just such an approach, allowing for
Congress to lengthen copyright terms well beyond the initial statutory
grants created by the Framers. Now, in Golan, Congress may freely
remove works, which have been relied upon to advance knowledge, the arts,
and literary creation and expression, from the public domain. Permitting
this activity comes with the added irony that Congress’ divestiture of these
works from the public does little to promote the interests of authors – whom
the copyright clause is designed to protect. Allowing Congress to remove
these works from the public domain arguably does greater harm than good
to the Nation’s cultural advancement.210
After Wheaton, Dastar, Eldred, and Golan it is clear that any effort to
attain moral rights for authors will have to come from Congressional action
through the form of statutory requirements that explicitly provide for such
rights, or through the legislatures of the states enacting their own
protections, or be provided for specifically in the contractual agreements
entered into between authors and the distributors of their work.
C. THE ROLE OF THE LITERARY CONTRACT
Henry C. Mitchell asserts,
“[i]t is also important to remember that the interests of authors and
publishers generally run parallel, even if they are not identical.
The relationship is analagous to the relationship between the
members of the union and the management of a company: each
seeks to gain at the expense of the other, but each needs the other
to survive.211

208. Id. Indeed, Justice Breyer also notes that this problem of “orphan works” has already
resulted in libraries and universities being unable to make available substantial collections
available to the public. Id.
209. Id. at 906 (emphasis added).
210. Id. at 910.
211. HENRY C. MITCHELL, THE INTELLECTUAL COMMONS: TOWARD AN ECOLOGY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 150 (2005).
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This is a pragmatic view concerned with the underlying commercial
transaction being consummated between two distinct parties with a shared
purpose – publication of a particular literary work.212 It is also a narrow
approach to an issue that has much larger dynamics, as illustrated by Dastar
and Eldred, and by the concern that the Framers showed in drafting the
Federal Constitution’s limited time requirement for copyright protection.213
These larger issues should be of concern not only to individuals entering
into a literary contract, whereby they seek some right of publication or other
form of distribution, rather, these issues should be of concern to every
member of our society; and, Mitchell’s contention that authors and
publishers have an inherently shared interest should be especially
scrutinized. While this is certainly true on a surface level, the underlying
dynamics of the transaction are arguably not shared.214 The power will
more often than not, in negotiations between author and distributor, rest
with the more powerful entity, typically the distributor.215 After all, if the
author had power of their own to print and publish, they probably would
pursue that course of action. Thus, it is important at the outset to
acknowledge that individual authors, especially those not yet recognized as
having commercial value because of who they are will likely to have an
especially difficult time negotiating rights equivalent to moral rights. Moral
rights should arguably be guaranteed under the Berne Convention, but
authors are limited under United States laws pertaining to protections of
authorial rights. It is important to recognize that as reassuring and desirable
as it is to have a literary contract proposed, negotiated, and consummated
between private actors, concerning distribution of a literary work of art
viewed through a paradigm of an inherently private transaction, it is not so
simple. Agreements to publish literary works cannot be viewed as simply
occurring in a vacuum between two private parties, because of the
significant intellectual and creative force those works have to render into
the collective body of knowledge of the community – that is, the wealth of
the nation.

212. See generally id. (providing examples of how this argument applies to user-centered
intellectual property theories).
213. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214. Madeo, supra note 21, at 217 (explaining that current law does not provide an adequate
remedy to authors’ work that is distorted throughout the publication process).
215. Ng, Authors Rights, supra note 16, at 471 (“The author alone is seldom capable,
financially and strategically, of marketing the work or transforming the original work into a
different artistic medium without the assistance of a publisher and financier. Even if the author
may have the financial capability and market connections to market the work or transform the
original into a new medium, he may lack the business acumen to manage the commercial
exploitation of the work.”).
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While literary contracts are chiefly private, between private parties,
contracted according to their interests, demands, and desires, and guided by
freedom of contract, this is not necessarily the best approach. There is a
particular social importance which attaches to some literature, though
admittedly, not all creative works.216 Thus, we must reassess some of our
traditional views concerning contracts as they apply to the narrow, specific
cases of literary contracts, with a view to both the private, personal interests
of the parties, and the larger, long-term public interests in ensuring that
works of artistic integrity enter into the stream of commerce as the author
intends through ensuring long-term benefit to the author in the form of
moral rights, and that they subsequently become a part of the public domain
of knowledge and use within a reasonable amount of time.
IV. ENSURING THE WEALTH OF THE NATION: COPYRIGHT
TERMS, MORAL RIGHTS, AND AUTHORS AND THEIR
CONTRACTS
In a speech before Congress, the great American writer Samuel
Clemens (better known as Mark Twain), made the following remarks,
The excuse for a limited copyright in the United States is that an
author who has produced a book and has had the benefit of it for
that term has had the profit of it long enough, and therefore the
Government takes the property, which does not belong to it, and
generously gives it to the eighty-eight millions. That is the idea.
If it did that, that would be one thing. But it does not do anything
of the kind. It merely takes the author’s property, merely takes
from his children the bread and profit of that book, and gives the
publisher double profit.
The publisher and some of his
confederates who are in the conspiracy rear families in affluence,
and they continue the enjoyment of these ill-gotten gains
generation after generation. They live forever, the publishers
do.217 (emphasis added)
Twain who was advocating for the increase in copyright protections then
under consideration by Congress, clearly wanted longer terms, and
216. I do not entirely agree with the evaluation suggested by Alina Ng. However, I think she
has correctly deduced and articulated the problems associated with a purely economic oriented
methodology by which to assess artistic merit, and to decide from that perspective which works
deserve copyright protection, as opposed to an approach that takes authorial ethics into account.
See id. at 493-94.
217. Arguments Before the Comm. on Patents of the Senate and House, Conjointly, on S.
6330 and H.R. 19583 to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 59th Cong. 11617 (1966).
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Congress subsequently enacted them, in the form of the 1909 Copyright
Act.218 But Twain’s rhetoric is somewhat misdirected and misguided, in
that it confuses two issues. It is not the government, per se which “takes the
property,” rather the government ceases to give it protection under law.
This is an important distinction, because it is by negative act that a work of
literary art becomes a part of the public domain, and not an active taking as
Twain seems to imply.219 Moreover, it is not the government who “gives
the publisher double profit,” by allowing the publisher to reprint without
requiring royalties to be paid to the author, rather it is the common pool of
knowledge and resources from which the publisher is drawing from the
public domain, and disseminating to individuals that is the true subject of
Twain’s scorn. And that is the point.220 To not reward publishers who
seize upon things as soon as they enter into the public domain, and who
reprint an author’s work without any concomitant requirement of payment
to the author or his heirs. Instead, the point is to ensure the creative
achievement never dies with the author – whether Mark Twain or
Shakespeare – so that instead of vesting solely in the author’s earthly
representative (the work’s distributor), it becomes accessible to all. In fact,
the individual plaintiff at the center of Eldred, Eric Eldred, maintained a
website where he collected and digitized books as they came into the public
domain, free for all to use.
While Twain was undoubtedly concerned about the length of copyright
at the time it existed, his philosophy nevertheless stands against the intent
of the Framers, and arguably, against the overarching premise of intellectual
achievement and knowledge.221 Knowledge enjoys a privileged vantage
point in society, both historically and today, and without free dissemination
and exchange of knowledge, ideas, and creative achievements, society’s
growth is stunted, and every individual suffers as a result.222 As Lawrence
Lessig, the lawyer who argued Eldred before the United States Supreme
Court, stated
218. ASS’N OF RES. LIBRARIES, supra note 80.
219. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 30-34 (1964) (noting the right an author has to reap
the economic benefit of his creativity, but balancing that right with the rights the public has to free
and unfettered access to the creative work).
220. Lessig, supra note 183, at 1069 (“This modern, ordinary view, is far from our Framers’.
When they chose not to protect copyright in perpetuity, it was not because they did not love
property; nor was it because they were budding communists. It was instead because they believed
in the power of the Enlightenment, and Protestant as they were, they believed enlightenment
happened when culture was not controlled by the church. Their idea was that ideas and stories
and culture would be free - as quickly as the law could set them free.”).
221. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308-09 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(discussing the “marketplace of ideas” in the context of First Amendment concerns).
222. Id.

202

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88:161

[W]e have become used to an idea that was not our Framers’. We
have become accustomed to thinking of the monopoly rights that
the state extends not as privileges granted to authors in exchange
for creativity, but as rights. And not as rights that get defined or
balanced against other state interests, but as rights that are, like
natural property rights, permanent and absolute.223
Lessig’s assessment stands in stark contrast to that suggested by Twain, and
argues that rather than government running amok seizing authors’ creative
works, the stream of what can be “seized” and delivered into the public
domain is steadily being reduced, with Congress’ acquiescence (and the
Supreme Court’s acceptance) to the vast detriment of both authors and the
public. Both authors and the public suffer when the effort to commercialize
literary works becomes a relentless pursuit to keep them in private hands,
for private purposes indefinitely, while keeping the public as a secondary
concern.224 Such an approach demeans the cultural greatness that literary
and other artistic works have to offer the social community, and ultimately
restrains the potential for other creative works to emerge. Such restrictions
serve to deprive society of valuable contributions of authors that might
otherwise be more freely available.225 There is also a certain irony in
enacting vast terms of copyright protection that no one will really ever live
to see expire, while continuing to deny authors protections for moral rights.
And it certainly begs the question of what interests have become the heart
of what we are seeking to protect?226
It is difficult to find hope for the view that public interests should be an
important consideration in our understanding of copyright law, when the
Supreme Court seems to suggest that profit is the sole force which both
motivates creativity, and ensures the progress of science. 227 But this
223. Lessig, supra note 183, at 1068.
224. Ng, Authors and Readers, supra note 30, at 415 (“The grant of property rights to
copyright owners and not authors in today’s system creates a market for literary and artistic works
that does not encourage the development of authorship and the process of creativity needed for the
production of works for the public.”).
225. Of course modern technology can also be mobilized in the effort to thwart access to
literary work. See, e.g., Matthew Finnegan, Harper Collins Rouses Gang of Angry Librarians,
TECHEYE (Mar. 1, 2011, 2:10 PM), http://www.techeye net/internet/harper-collins-rouses-gangof-angry-librarians; Benedicte Page, Fury over ‘stupid’ restrictions to Library ebook loans,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2011, 7:44 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2011/mar/01/restrictionslibrary-ebook-loans (both articles discuss proposed restrictions, by publishers, on the number of
times an electronic e-book can be downloaded and read by library patrons, under the licenses
possessed by libraries).
226. Lessig, supra note 183, at 1068-69 (suggesting that those interests have become
interests of commercialization, and profits in the hands of the few – certainly not, to respond to
Twain’s concerns about extending copyright protections, to the author).
227. Indeed, especially troubling is the restoration of copyright to those works which have
entered the public domain. See Adam Liptak, Restoring Copyright to Public Domain Works, N.Y.
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approach to conceptualizing literature, art, and creative achievements is
symptomatic of a much larger societal problem, one which Lessig addresses
quite forcefully. Lessig asserts:
This view of the naturalness of intellectual property is not simply
the construction of overly eager Hollywood lobbyists. Is it not
simply the product of campaign contributions and insider
corruption. The reality is that it reflects the understanding of
ordinary people, too. The ordinary person believes, as Disney’s
Michael Eisner does, that Mickey Mouse should be Disney’s for
time immemorial. The ordinary person doesn’t even notice the
irony of perpetual protection for Disney for Mickey, while Disney
turns out Hunchback of Notre Dame (to the horror of the Victor
Hugo estate), or Pocahontas, or any number of stories that it can
use to make new work. The ordinary person doesn’t notice,
because the ordinary person has become so accustomed to the idea
that culture is managed – that corporations decide what gets
released when, and that the law can be used to protect criticism
when the law is being used to protect property – that the ordinary
person can’t imagine the world of balance our Framers created.228
Literature, and other forms of art, have significant cultural value for our
social community, and for the progress of society. This is embodied in our
Federal Constitution, and is implicit in the balance that has been struck
between private rights and public interests.
As has been made clear by Wheaton and Dastar, moral rights do not
exist in the United States, absent Congressional enactment of express
statutory protections designed to effectuate those rights.229 This is the
wrong approach to dealing with authors and their literary works. While we
continue to expand copyright term protections, we continue to deny basic
rights to authors that have long been enjoyed in other countries, with whom
we share similar histories and backgrounds. Instead of viewing such rights
as anathema to economic or other commercial interests, we should
recognize that works of art, especially those of a literary nature, serve the
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/us/22bar html.
Arguably,
combining Congressional authority to extend again and again copyright protections to currently
copyrighted work, thus preventing its expiration into the public domain, combined with
retroactively granting copyright to those works that have entered the public domain, come
dangerously close to rendering the Federal Constitution’s public interest inherent in the copyright
clause immaterial.
228. Lessig, supra note 183, at 1069.
229. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003). “When
Congress has wished to create such an addition to the law of copyright, it has done so with much
more specificity than the Lanham Act’s ambiguous use of ‘origin.’” Id. (emphasis added).
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overall wealth of the nation by increasing our common resources of
knowledge, and provide the substance of our national identity and cultural
spirit – all of which advances our collective national interests. As such,
works of literary art should be treated in a way that recognizes their larger,
long-term interests in the social community, which respects the creator of
those works – the author. Little is lost by enacting copyright laws that
protect the rights of attribution; indeed, absent an agreement to the contrary,
such a right seems one basically ingrained in the right of an author’s
personhood and their literary creation, which is arguably inseparable from
that personhood.
The right of integrity seems one equally calculated to bring about the
long-term interests of ensuring works of literary and artistic merit that are
not grossly distorted by short-term economic profit, and which ultimately
enter the public domain.230 The rights of withdrawal, and disclosure
potentially raise problematic issues, however, because they can occur after a
contract has been signed, or after the work has already been placed on the
market. However, with proper indemnification clauses or other similar
requirements, or writing into law implied or express waivers of these
protections, authors and their distributors can continue to carry on business
with, moreover, this knowledge at the front-end of the relationship that
those rights exist, and that they may (and probably should) be negotiated as
part of the overall literary contract.
By enacting these provisions we honor and respect authors as part of
the national wealth, acknowledge the intellectual creations that propel the
nation forward, and ensure that these works meet with the expectations of
their authors, that they continue to be identified as the creator of their work,
and that the work not be distorted or modified, such that Hemingway’s
thoughtful, existential hero in THE SUN ALSO RISES, Jake Barnes, is not
devolved into a comedic figure, better suited for laughter than for
philosophical contemplation, or Bryce Courtney’s THE POWER OF ONE is
not distorted to change, for example, the location of the novel from South
Africa to Texas, because politics, history, and ethical choice matter for
these authentic works of literary art. Moreover, such rights should continue
into the future, and be alienable to subsequent successors in interest of the
author’s moral right, such that an author’s wishes continue to be

230. Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions, supra note 124, at 439 (suggesting that
“[w]hen a publisher usurps an author’s creative control, the author’s work can become an
instrument for profit-maximization instead of authentic self-expression, leading to a uniform
product that reflects an effort to create consumer needs, rather than to meet them”).
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respected.231 Indeed, as Donald Francis Madeo noted, in assessing the
United States’ lack of moral rights where author’s literary creations are
concerned, “[t]he current law does not penetrate the core problem – what
happens when someone, whether it be a publisher, biographer or even a
literary executor, ignores the wishes of the author violating the author’s
wishes and compromising the author’s artistic integrity?”232
Of course, part of the problem with enacting moral rights is, in some
ways, changing the view that an author’s work is merely an economic
product, exploitable, mutable, transferable, and not, as it arguably should be
viewed, as something part of the larger cultural discourse and national
wealth.233 However, simply because literary artifacts and the copyright
protections they enjoy have so-long been viewed as being mere economic
commodities in the eyes of the law, as exemplified by Ginsburg’s opinion
in Eldred, there is no reason to continue to view them as such. Instead,
such prevailing views should become the flashpoint for restoring literature
and its place in the cultural space of the community as a core American
value, concomitant with the recognition of fundamental rights for literary
creators.
All of these larger concerns regarding moral rights (and to an extent
copyright protection terms), devolve back into the singular space they
occupy at the outset – the contract between author and distributor of the
author’s work. This is the fundamental place, operating within the
“carefully crafted bargain”234 that forms the backdrop for their negotiations.
However, as with so many contracts negotiated between individuals and
larger entities, authors will usually, though not always, be in a poorer
position to bargain in terms of parity of bargaining power.235 However,
with the recognition of moral rights, authors will be given new tools to
ensure the integrity of their literary work, while also providing incentives to
would-be distributors in crafting their agreements with authors.
By having statutory provisions concerning moral rights, these
provisions would form the backdrop for any private negotiations taking
place between author and distributor. They would inform both parties
231. But see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 580 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of
the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings . . . but upon
the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will
be prompted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.
Congress thus seeks to define the rights included in copyright so as to serve the public welfare and
not necessarily so as to maximize an author’s control over his or her product.” (citations omitted)).
232. Madeo, supra note 21, at 217.
233. Lessig, supra note 183, at 1072-73.
234. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003).
235. Ng, Author Rights, supra note 16, at 471.
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decisions, and could potentially provide the author with some greater
leverage to extract from their distributor assurances that the work would be
attributed to them, ensure the integrity of the work, and potentially allow
the author to seek further specific assurances against the work being
disclosed when not ready, or to withdraw the work if the author later
fundamentally changes their intellectual viewpoint, such that the work is no
longer representative of them. These statutory provisions could be subject
to waiver with consent of the author, be required in certain instances by
statute, or be non-waivable, depending on Congressional or other legislative
decision. The point is, however, that such rights should be present at the
front-end of the negotiations, and should form a cornerstone of author–
distributor negotiations, as opposed to being something foreign and distant.
Finally, if the author consciously and freely chooses to relinquish their
moral rights, they should receive, in addition to their already negotiated
agreement, some form of further consideration.236 This is in accord with
practices in other jurisdictions, and seems a reasonable one, calculated to
ensure the overall fairness of the agreement – the author gives up
something, and the distributor, in exchange, must pay or give something
more for that relinquishment of right by the author. However, it must be
recognized that often such consideration for relinquishment of moral rights
will be little to nothing, and instead will be compelled (and thus rendered
pro forma) as part of the overall approach of the distributor to getting the
deal that most represents their demands. In such instances, the doctrine of
unconscionability seems aptly suited to deal with these necessary and
searching inquiries (should these agreements be litigated), to ascertain
whether, in fact, the consideration was so low, and the moral right so great,
that the term of the agreement should be struck in favor of an author’s
moral rights, which is also, as has been argued, a vindication of public
interests.237 Such a use of unconscionability is in accord with its underlying
purpose, and should be used not to strike agreements that are merely so
shocking to the conscience as to render them unenforceable, but also to
vindicate substantial and significant public interests in the national wealth

236. Whether negligible or not, this requirement of additional consideration nevertheless
gives notice to both writer and publisher of the right(s) for which release or modification are being
negotiated, and places an additional right within the purview of the author for his authentic and
creative work.
237. See Michael B. Lopez, Resurrecting the Public Good: Amending the Validity Exception
in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods for the 21st
Century, 10 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 133, 165-66 (2010) (discussing in the context of international trade
the use of unconscionability to equalize bargaining disparities in order to reduce the threat of
overreaching).
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of its literary and artistic creations.238 Of course, expanding the use of
unconscionability this way will require a cultural shift in thinking on the
part of courts, but so too will understanding moral rights as being not just
author rights, but rights designed to effectuate a larger social purpose, by
having in the public repository of knowledge works of genuine literary
merit.
V. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A LITERARY CONTRACT
FOR TOMORROW
The great Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard wrote, “[t]here is
something of greatness about me, but because of the poor state of the
market I am not worth much.”239 Kierkegaard would have known much
about the literary market at the time he lived. Though he was a particularly
well-known figure in Denmark, and certainly in his hometown of
Copenhagen, most of his works never sold especially well. And yet he has
grown to be one of the most influential philosophers of our time, even
though he died in 1855. Similarly, the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche,
whose works sold poorly, such as THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA, BEYOND
GOOD AND EVIL, and THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS, continue to inspire
intellectual thought, debate, and societal growth, not just in his native
Germany, but everywhere in the world.240 Poets like A.E. Housman, who
could not even find a publisher for his seminal volume, A SHROPSHIRE
LAD, now an enduring classic were forced to self-publish, before they could
find commercial, and thus publishing recognition. Artists like the great
Impressionist Vincent Van Gogh sold only a single painting in his lifetime,
and yet now one is hard pressed to find a college dorm room or apartment
that does not have a mechanically reproduced image of his “The Starry
Night” or “Café Terrace at Night,” hanging in it.
All of these examples speak to the fundamental reasons of why the
market is not necessarily the place best suited for creating and sustaining
genius, but even more so, why the Federal Constitution provides for a
limited times rationale for copyright protection. Indeed, one of the central
238. Cf. Phillip Bridwell, The Philosophical Dimensions of the Doctrine of
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1516-20 (2003) (discussing the rise of “positivefreedom” criticism in assessing the usefulness of unconscionability).
239. SØREN KIERKEGAARD, PAPERS AND JOURNALS: A SELECTION 179 (Alastair Hannay
ed. & trans., 1996).
240. See R.J. HOLLINGDALE, NIETZSCHE: THE MAN AND HIS PHILOSOPHY 179 (2001)
(noting that the first three parts of Nietzsche’s THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA [now a classic of
philosophy] were commercial failures, and that his publisher declined to print the fourth edition);
see also Peter Gay, Introduction to BASIC WRITINGS OF NIETZSCHE, at xix-xxiii (Walter
Kaufmann trans., 2000).
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contentions of this article is that the Framers never intended for works such
as those, for example, by Housman, Nietzsche, Van Gogh, or Kierkegaard
to stay forever in the domain of their publishers, long after they had died
and could no longer reap the rewards of their creative genius. Instead, the
intent was to reward them for a time, and then to release those works into
the public milieu and discourse of intellectual thought, discussion, debate,
and creativity of the larger social community, that the next generation of
Van Gogh’s, Kierkegaard’s, Mozart’s and Beethoven’s might come forward
to carry society ever further, through the advancement of knowledge and
culture.
And yet our current system of copyright, avoidance of moral rights for
authors, and misplaced trust in the fair, bargained for exchange between
authors and their distributors is not best situated, as it currently stands, to
effectuate the larger hope and purpose of the Federal Constitution’s
copyright requirements, nor the larger social interests which it is intended to
serve. The modest proposals presented here, reducing the period of
copyright years for a work to be protected, granting authors moral rights
through creating statutory protections that can be used in contract
negotiations, and utilizing doctrines like unconscionability to ensure the
overarching public interest in literary works of artistic merit, represent a
measured approach.
Such an approach protects private, economic interests (copyright
protections remain intact) that reward individual creativity and ingenuity,
authors (ensuring the integrity and attribution of their work), and the
general public (that knowledge and information be recognized as something
for everyone to participate and grow from). This is the ideology that should
guide us as we continue to confront modern issues of copyright, author
rights, and the contracts that authors enter into – and, as Wheaton, Eldred,
Dastar, and Golan show, they are not likely to diminish or vanish. In
suggesting this moderate proposal, the hope is that all of the individual
holders of interest – distributors of authorial material, authors, and the
public, see that through reasonably measuring each holder’s interest, while
constraining it in an equally measured way, everyone in society benefits,
because we all have access to the knowledge, creativity, and information
necessary to grow. The end goal of that growth should be to built upon –
not replace – the artistic and literary greats who have come before, and to
nourish the growth and development (and economic potential) of the next
generation of Hemingway’s and Van Gogh’s that remain yet to be
discovered and disseminated.

